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Conference Services

**WORKSHOP ON IMPLEMENTATION OF  
THE OSCE DOCUMENT ON SMALL  
ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS**

**Vienna, 4 and 5 February 2002**

**CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY**

**CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT**

**REPORTS OF THE  
WORKING SESSION RAPPORTEURS**



# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

<b>CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT</b> .....	1
-----------------------------------	---

## **REPORTS OF THE WORKING SESSION RAPPORTEURS:**

<b>Working Session I</b> .....	5
--------------------------------	---

Agenda item 3.2: Review of the first information exchange:

- Presentation of the review and analysis of the first information exchange
- Aspects: Overview of main features, recommendations, lessons learned
- Discussion and recommendations

<b>Working Session II</b> .....	7
---------------------------------	---

Agenda item 3.3: Review of specific issues for developing “best practices”

- National marking systems
- Procedures for the control of the manufacture of SALW
- Relevant national legislation and current practices regarding export policy, procedures and documentation; and control over international brokering in SALW
- Effective stockpile management and security, and techniques and procedures for destruction of SALW, including the work of other international organizations and institutions
- Co-ordination of possible technical assistance through the CPC (including techniques and procedures for destruction)
- Possible structure of a “best practice” handbook on small arms measures, and modalities for its development
- Discussion and recommendations

<b>Working Session III</b> .....	10
----------------------------------	----

Agenda item 3.4: Implementation of the Document and its possible contribution to combating terrorism

- Implementation of the measures set forth in the Document (especially Section V)
- Role of relevant OSCE institutions
- Discuss the establishment of a team of experts to assist participating States; possible use of REACT to provide these experts
- Co-operation and co-ordination with other institutions
- Discussion and recommendations

<b>Working Session IV</b> .....	14
---------------------------------	----

Agenda item 3.5: Possible further OSCE actions, co-ordination and co-operation with other institutions

- Possible further activities of the OSCE: preparation of future information exchanges (preliminary work on guidelines)

**Working Session IV (continued)**

- Co-ordination and co-operation with the United Nations Programme of Action, and regional initiatives and specific projects
- Discussion and recommendations

**Annex 1:** Agenda, modalities and tentative timetable for a Workshop on Implementation of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) (FSC.DEC/8/01)

**Annex 2:** Log of contributions to the Workshop on Implementation of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons

## **CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT**

This report of the Chairperson of the Workshop on Implementation of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) is based on the reports on working sessions and the contributions by experts.

The challenges posed by the destabilizing accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons have become a priority for our Organization, especially in the light of the OSCE's focus on anti-terrorist initiatives. Over a year has passed since the adoption of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), and during that time much progress has been made towards its full and complete implementation. It was in recognition of this that the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) agreed that the time had come to take stock of the implementation of the Document and to consider the way forward.

The Workshop on the Implementation of the OSCE Document on SALW was convened in Vienna on 4 and 5 February 2002, and was assigned an ambitious agenda of review and discussion. Initially intended to review the information collected as a result of the first information exchange, in June 2001, the scope of the Workshop was broadened as a result of discussions in the Forum during the preceding months. National experts discussed the elaboration of best practices in respect of marking, manufacture controls, export and import controls and destruction techniques. They discussed possible ways and means for implementing Section V of the Document, which deals with SALW measures as part of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, and examined the possible contribution of the Document to the fight against terrorism. Finally, they had an opportunity to hear from other international organizations and institutions, as well as non-governmental organizations, on their activities and their views on the implementation of the Document.

In the opinion of the Chairperson, the Workshop was invaluable in identifying the next steps for the FSC. It was notable that the general feeling was that there was no immediate need for new negotiations or standard-setting exercises. Instead, the focus should be on the ongoing implementation of agreed commitments and possible further work on them.

The Workshop highlighted the clear need for the development of guides to best practices in certain key areas related to the control of SALW. These best practices would be of use to all the participating States of the OSCE in implementing the provisions of the Document, and would also benefit other regions in their work in the same field. The Chairperson also took note of the wish of participating States for more thorough preparation for the 2002 information exchanges, particularly through the preparation of templates and model answers. The Chairperson was pleased to note that a number of participating States were offering assistance and support for these measures, as well as for the implementation of other provisions of the Document. Of relevance in this connection was the desire expressed by many delegations to fully implement Section V and to foster the role of the OSCE missions and field operations in this regard. The Chairperson was grateful for the contribution of representatives of the field missions, which delegations found very informative. Furthermore, the Chairperson welcomed the suggestions made to enhance

co-operation with other international organizations, particularly with a view to combating terrorism. On this issue, the Chairperson noted the clear need for further examination of the role that could be played by the Document in countering terrorism.

The review of information exchange formed the basis of discussions at the Workshop. Several delegations noted that the first information exchange had been the broadest such exchange on small arms and light weapons (SALW) ever undertaken. The overview provided by the experts seconded by the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) (Dr. Krause and Ms. Susiluoto) was considered to be invaluable in identifying patterns of policy and practice among participating States. Delegations called attention to the need for more consistent and complete information in a more standardized format. In this context, it was thought that the use of a template, together with a common language and terminology, would be a major step forward. Many delegations felt that a clear set of criteria setting out what constituted complete and useful information should also be developed, so that more accurate, thorough, meaningful and comparable information could be provided.

The Chairperson considers the FSC to be well suited to develop such a template. It would be very desirable for the authors of the overview regarding the first information exchange on SALW to have a part in developing the template.

The overview of the information exchange enabled delegations to begin discussing best practices. A wide range of important experiences were presented during the Workshop. The knowledge provided by the expert speakers gave a useful picture of the broad spectrum of different national efforts and experiences. Combined with the data provided by the information exchange, it had a synergistic effect.

Delegations were generally in agreement that this knowledge and the data should be used for the development of a best practices handbook. The Chairperson does not expect the handbook to be a negotiated document, although there is a clear need for guidance from the FSC. The CPC could act as a focal point to co-ordinate national contributions in this regard, but should also take into account existing publications and work being pursued in other fora. Some delegations suggested that the handbook could also include issues which were not specifically covered by the OSCE Document. In the Chairperson's view, such a handbook could help to counter new emerging threats to international security related to the illicit trade in SALW.

The Workshop gave participating States the first real opportunity to deal comprehensively with Section V of the Document. The presentations by mission members reflected the real problems, situations and needs in this regard and gave the working session its distinctive character. However, it has clearly not been possible to tackle the integration of SALW measures into early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation using the focus that had originally been planned. In particular, questions remained open regarding the future role of the FSC and the Permanent Council (PC) in elaborating and implementing some concrete measures proposed by the experts. Here, further work by the FSC will be needed.

Several delegations supported the view that there might be a need to draw up a framework in the area of SALW for missions concerned. However, it should be noted that,

although recommendations could be made by the FSC, the PC has ultimate responsibility for directing field missions.

It emerged that assistance in its broader sense would clearly be required in order to enable additional tasks to be assigned to the missions in this regard. Concrete measures proposed during the Workshop which would require such assistance included the fostering of national implementation; the creation of a roster of experts or use of the REACT system for this purpose; training; and support for the CPC.

The Chairperson notes the need for the SALW contribution to combating terrorism and organized crime to be pursued further and with more focus. Although one expert covered this question in recommending measures to deal with criminal activities, such as increased control of international brokering, improved marking and record-keeping, and border controls, including airspace, there remained a gap. This matter could be taken up in the proposed seminar of experts on terrorism.

Regarding next steps, speakers characterized the development of a template for a more standardized reporting on implementation of the SALW Document as the most urgent step. Developing best practices handbooks was identified as another course of action in which co-operation with other international organizations and NGOs was desirable; in this context, the need to assign a role to regional and sub-regional organizations was emphasized.

Concrete projects and initiatives were vital in support of thorough implementation. Co-operation with other organizations, in order to prevent duplication and to pool resources and expertise, would be important in this context. One example of such action might be border control assistance, particularly in Central Asia. Attention was drawn by one delegation to the magnitude and complexity of the SALW problem in Afghanistan, which clearly affects OSCE participating States.

The Chairperson expects and intends to ensure that the follow-up to the Workshop takes place in the FSC. Much remains to be done. Priorities include the development of templates for the information exchanges, including retrospective model answers for last year's exchange; the elaboration of best practices handbooks; and the operationalization of Section V with regard to contributing to the fight against terrorism. In this regard, the Chairperson of the FSC intends to co-ordinate with the Chairmanship-in-Office in considering and preparing a joint PC/FSC meeting on the OSCE contribution to combating terrorism. The FSC Chairperson could also take the outcome of the SALW Workshop into account in preparing the meeting/seminar of experts on terrorism being considered by the FSC. Such a meeting could usefully devote further attention to enhancing the implementation of Section V of the SALW Document.

In conclusion, the Chairperson notes that participation in the Workshop by the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation and Partners for Co-operation was useful in that it strengthened their co-operative interaction with participating States. The Workshop also greatly benefited from the active involvement by international organizations and their contributions, which promoted the desirable synergy and complementarity underlying the OSCE's approach to security. The Chairperson also considers that everyone profited from the interaction with NGOs in the plenary meetings, and that the involvement of NGOs could be enhanced at future FSC events of this kind. The Chairperson personally believes that this

positive experience might help to bring about a consensus on the fuller involvement of NGOs.

Finally, the Chairperson would like to express his gratitude to all the chairpersons, expert speakers and rapporteurs for their splendid performance, and to the CPC staff, specifically Ms. Joseph, as well as to the Conference Services and interpreters for their support, and to everyone present for their substantive and valuable contributions.



## WORKING SESSION I

Monday, 4 February 2002

### Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

Agenda item 3.2: Review of the first information exchange:

- Presentation of the review and analysis of the first information exchange
- Aspects: Overview of main features, recommendations, lessons learned
- Discussion and recommendations

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1. The first information exchange on small arms and light weapons was one of the broadest ever undertaken. Overall the assessment of the two experts who analyzed the returns was that the information exchange enabled specific and significant conclusions to be reached, and that it was possible in some areas for a list of best practices to be drawn up. The exercise provided a solid foundation for further work to be carried out and participating States would now be able to understand to a far better degree where their own policies fitted into the broad picture of small arms and light weapons controls.

2. The experts noted however that the majority of responses did not provide a high level of detail. The returns showed the use of widely divergent criteria for determining what constituted complete and useful information. Participating States used different approaches. This made compiling complete and usable information difficult. The difficulty could be attributed to the nature of the exercise, the first of its kind, and the fact that there were few clear guidelines or models on which States could base their returns.

3. The returns very much focused on small arms, and in general little attention was paid to light weapons and ammunition. Evaluation was made all the more difficult because some reports were received late and there was limited time to make meaningful analyses. These were matters that could be put right before the second information exchange.

4. In this regard the experts recommended that participating States should be encouraged to update and correct information to complete the information exchange. Such updating would be extremely helpful when seeking to identify best practices. The experts also suggested that the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) be tasked with providing assistance to participating States to complete or update returns. Finally, perhaps one of the most important recommendations was that consideration should be given to the development of a template for the second information exchange, including the use of a common language and terminology.

5. Participating States noted that the first information exchange and the experts' report were a major step forward. It was also noted that implementation would require much more work but that a start had been made. There was a concern that there should not be so much focus on uniform reporting as the goal of the information exchanges. Rather the exchanges were a means to get measures in place to provide for effective and robust controls. However the use of a template would go some way towards achieving consistent reporting thus enabling more robust conclusions to be drawn. What was being sought was not harmonization, but standardization, in order to provide more complete and accurate information.

6. Information exchanges were a key component in demonstrating transparency. In order for information to be as complete as possible, consideration right be given to following up gaps in the information with participating States. There was also the possibility of devising questionnaires with model answers. These areas could and should be considered for the second information exchange.

7. Brokering was an important area for the control of small arms and light weapons. Participating States noted that there needed to be some measure of harmonization of control on brokering activities. The risk was that unless there were effective controls in place there would be loopholes that could be exploited. This area was one of those that received the least coverage in the information exchange, particularly in relation to national legislative measures and practices in export control policy. More attention was required on this topic for the next information exchange, and some degree of assistance, perhaps legal assistance, might be necessary.

8. The information on the destruction of small arms and light weapons made this one of the most thoroughly reported topics. Such complete information enabled a detailed analysis to be made of destruction methods. Further work however was still required on assistance for destruction.

9. To conclude. Participating States noted that the first information exchange was the broadest such exchange on small arms and light weapons ever undertaken. The returns provided a high degree of information. But more could and should be done. The aim was to achieve more consistent and complete information in a more standardized format. In this context the use of a template, together with a common language and terminology, would be a major step forward. A clear set of criteria setting out what constituted complete and useful information should also be developed, so that more thorough, meaningful and comparable information could be provided.

## WORKING SESSION II

Monday, 4 February 2002

### Report of the Working Session Rapporteurs:

Agenda item 3.3: Review of specific issues for developing “best practices”

- National marking systems
- Procedures for the control of the manufacture of SALW
- Relevant national legislation and current practices regarding export policy, procedures and documentation; and control over international brokering in SALW
- Effective stockpile management and security, and techniques and procedures for destruction of SALW, including the work of other international organizations and institutions
- Co-ordination of possible technical assistance through the CPC (including techniques and procedures for destruction)
- Possible structure of a “best practice” handbook on small arms measures, and modalities for its development
- Discussion and recommendations

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The aim of Working Session II was to look more closely at national practices for the control and management of small arms and light weapons (SALW) to start exploring ways to develop a possible guide to best practice.

#### 1. National marking systems

Three presenters described the basic standards for marking systems in their own countries.

Despite some differences concerning marking procedures, basic common standards were defined as follows:

Marks must be visible and not easily defaced. They must appear on an integral element (such as the receiver) of the weapon. Marks were applied to military weapons as well as weapons for civilian use.

Marking was not a measure on its own, but part of a management system that also included record keeping and traceability. The importance of traceability in developing a marking and record keeping system was emphasized.

National practices on record keeping differ in terms of specific procedures. For example, several countries noted that they had central registries, while others did not. Nor was there uniformity in the length of time that records were kept (in general this varied between 10-20 years). The issue of record keeping was discussed, with concerns being raised

that the minimum length that records were kept might not be commensurate with the long life-cycles of SALW.

## **2. Procedures for the control of manufacture of SALW**

Control over licensed legal manufacture of SALW did not raise many difficulties and problems; the main problems stemmed from illicit possession and proliferation. According to police statistics, illegal manufacture, trade and possession of SALW was mostly connected with criminal and terrorist activities, including drugs, smuggling and prostitution.

It might be useful to have an information exchange on how countries approached the problem of illicit manufacture, including criminal penalties.

## **3. Relevant national legislation and current practices regarding export policy, procedures and documentation; and control over international brokering in SALW**

All of the presenters described robust national practices for arms exports. It was clear that export control and brokering issues were complex and national practices varied considerably from country to country.

Common characteristics, however, were identified by all presenters. Each arms transfer was authorized by a relevant government body. Arms exports should take into consideration national foreign policy interests and criteria for responsible arms transfers (e.g., standards for human rights, regional stability, contribution to crime and terrorism). A common definition of brokering activity might be useful. A precise and simple definition could be that a broker was an intermediary between a seller and a buyer.

Though it was demonstrated that there were a number of viable national systems for controlling exports and brokering, there was a need to cover the common loopholes that still existed. All brokers should be licensed and authorizations should be required for each transaction, without exception. Transit was pointed out as a weak link in terms of monitoring end use of arms transfers. A suggestion was made that extraterritorial controls should be eliminated as they were too difficult to enforce effectively at this point in time, though harmonization of practices could help to close loopholes.

One presenter noted the importance of reaching out to the arms industry so that exporters understood the rules and regulations to which they were subject. Difficulties remained with illegal and “rogue” commercial interests who were not part of the responsible community of arms manufacturers and exporters. The importance of criminal penalties for violations of arms export laws was stressed.

## **4. Effective stockpile management and security, and techniques and procedures for destruction of SALW, including the work of other international organizations and institutions.**

One presenter specifically addressed the issue of stockpile security and destruction in the context of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DD&R) activities. Without proper security and destruction of arms collected in peace operations, they were likely to be recycled into violent conflict elsewhere. Commanders in peacekeeping operations required

mandates so that they could effectively accomplish this mission. Guidelines for arms collection (whether forced disarmament or voluntary collection) would be useful; cataloguing lessons learned from previous experiences might be an important role for the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC).

Routine stockpile management and the methods of SALW destruction, such as torch cutting, crashing, pressing or smelting were reviewed. (The destruction of approximately 100,000 SALW in Albania was described in detail). Effective stockpile management and security should include careful monitoring including the use of video surveillance, motion-detecting sensors and other measures to ensure the safety and security of small arms storage and destruction.

#### **5. Co-ordination of possible technical assistance through the CPC (including techniques and procedures for destruction)**

There could be a role for the Forum for Security Council (FSC) to discuss the best approach in various areas of the SALW field, to develop a common understanding of the purpose and the methods, and to decide whether to make a handbook available outside the OSCE.

The CPC could usefully compile a assessment of existing best practice guides (e.g., United Nations Handbook on SALW destruction), co-ordinate contributions from sponsor nations, and consult with other international organizations and NGOs, as well as providing technical support.

#### **6. Possible structure of a “best practice” handbook on small arms measures, and modalities for its development**

A sample structure for a best practice handbook which could enhance the implementation of the OSCE document on SALW was presented.

#### **7. Conclusions by the Chair**

In Working Session II a wide variety of important experiences were presented. The experts provided a useful picture of the broad spectrum of different national efforts and experiences. That knowledge, combined with the data provided by the information exchange, obviously had a synergistic effect. This work must be continued. An initiative coming from this workshop could therefore lead to a best practices handbook.

Participating nations could be invited to provide information on their experiences to the CPC. The CPC might be tasked with the technical co-ordination of the national contributions. The CPC might also evaluate and take into account existing publications and work ongoing in other areas (NGOs, international organizations, etc.). A handbook could also include issues which were not specifically covered by the OSCE document on SALW.

Due to the concentration on specific items, e.g., best practices for marking, export control and brokering legislation, and stockpile management procedures, such a handbook could contribute to combating newly emerging threats to international security related to the illicit trade in SALW.

## WORKING SESSION III

Tuesday, 5 February 2002

### Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

- Agenda item 3.4: Implementation of the Document and its possible contribution to combating terrorism
- Implementation of the measures set forth in the Document (especially Section V)
  - Role of relevant OSCE institutions
  - Discuss the establishment of a team of experts to assist participating States; possible use of REACT to provide these experts
  - Co-operation and co-ordination with other institutions
  - Discussion and recommendations
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The session was moderated by Colonel GS Hans Eberhart, from the Swiss Delegation to the OSCE. The following main items were discussed:

1. Implementation of the measures set out in the document (especially Section V);
2. The role of relevant OSCE institutions (including OSCE missions);
3. The establishment of a team of experts to assist participating States and the possible use of REACT to provide these experts;
4. Co-operation and co-ordination with other institutions.

Introducing the agenda, Colonel Eberhart recalled the two main objectives of this session. Firstly, to explore the steps the OSCE needed to take in order to further improve implementation, to explore areas of possible co-operation with other organizations, and to consider how this document and its further implementation could contribute to the fight against terrorism and organized crime. Secondly, attention was drawn to Section V of the document. This section dealt with some of the challenges to be addressed: e.g. the destabilizing accumulation, uncontrolled spread, and illegal holding of small arms and light weapons (SALW). But it did not clarify the specific roots and challenges of the terrorist threat with regard to SALW. Section V, paragraph 1, also stated that the SALW problem was an integral element in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, but how could these tasks be tackled successfully? Finally, the moderator asked what concrete projects should be developed in order to achieve our objectives, and with which specific international organizations and institutions the OSCE should co-operate.

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1. The first key-note speaker, Ms. Riitta Korpivaara from the Arms Control Unit of the Finnish MFA, made a presentation on the **implementation of the measures set out in the document (especially Section V)**. She recalled that the fight against terrorism was one of the top priorities for the OSCE during the current year, and in this respect Chapter V of the OSCE document on SALW provided the FSC with the means to address the root causes and

main facilitators of terrorist networks. This, combined with the OSCE's field presence in the areas affected by both small arms problems and terrorist activities, provided the OSCE with a specific platform to develop practical measures to counter terrorism.

Ms. Korpivaara also developed and recommended three practical steps which could be taken in the short term to promote the establishment of SALW projects in the missions and to help the implementation of the SALW document: the assignment of small arms experts to the OSCE field missions, a roster of small arms experts (a concrete example was provided) and the establishment of a Voluntary Trust Fund, which could be run by the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC).

2. **The role of the relevant OSCE institutions** was addressed by representatives of the OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), the OSCE Mission to Georgia, and the OSCE Presence to Albania.

Mr. Vladimir Bilandzic, confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) Special Advisor of the OSCE Mission to FRY, highlighted the relevance of the OSCE SALW document for south eastern Europe. He provided an overview of the activities of the mission concerning the promotion of CSBMs (for instance, the organization of a Round Table), as well as concrete steps taken by the Yugoslav authorities for the destruction of surplus SALW, thus implementing the OSCE document in a physical way. He referred to participation in regional projects addressing these issues, as well as co-operation with NGOs. The provisions of the document most relevant for the region, which was still facing the threat of instability and terrorism, were also addressed. These included, for example, the provisions calling for the issuing of export licences to be avoided where the arms might be used to violate human rights, or to facilitate organized crime, or be used for the purpose of repression, or for supporting or encouraging terrorism, etc. Without prejudging specific projects, it seemed possible that the missions' future activities might include efforts in the field of manufacture and export control, amnesties and collection programmes, monitoring the destruction procedures, or assistance in drafting relevant laws and regulations on SALW.

Mr. Jozsef Deak, Military Adviser of the OSCE Mission to Georgia, after outlining the historical background to the destabilizing accumulation of SALW experienced in Georgia, discussed the programme to collect arms from the local population which started in January 2000. He considered that criminality was an increasing problem in the zone of conflict and was related to the widespread proliferation of arms. At that point in time, and without any compensation, 1268 units of small arms and ammunition and 205 kg of pure explosives had been handed over to the Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKFs). The next phase might include the compensation of the local population, collectively or individually, through various small funds, by assistance to the civil community structures within the agriculture, health, and education, sectors etc. Mr. Deak concluded by recalling that as small arms and criminality were closely linked, a successful hand-over of arms would contribute to security and stability in the zone of conflict, thus creating a favourable climate for the Georgian-South Ossetian peace settlement efforts as well as the mission's role in this process.

Mr. Philip Figgins, Field Station Co-ordinator of the OSCE Presence in Albania, after outlining the historical background to the situation in this country, mentioned the legal framework of the Weapons Collection Programme (WCP) introduced in February 2000. Recent reports from OSCE field stations suggested that enthusiasm for the collection

programme had declined. At present, the collection rate had fallen to about 1000 pieces per month across the country as a whole. Considering that since 1997 until the present only one third of looted weapons had been recovered, that equated to about 400,000 outstanding. Mr. Figgins went on to mention the problems related to the programme and to consider measures to improve the situation in the future.

3. The issue of **establishing a team of experts to assist participating States and the possible use of REACT to provide these experts** was addressed by Mr. Miguel Panadero from the OSCE Department of Human Resources. He first recalled and explained the relevant provisions of the OSCE Istanbul Document related to the establishment of REACT. He mentioned that, based on the analysis of the work carried out in existing OSCE field activities, a staffing matrix had been developed which divided the work into twelve fields of expertise at four levels of functional responsibility. He also recalled the different pillars of REACT. The REACT mechanisms could be used in the context of the implementation of the OSCE Document as follows:

- REACT could currently be applied to seconded personnel.
- The staffing matrix also anticipated a field of expertise relating to military affairs.
- This field covered the monitoring of military activities, monitoring the collection of weapons and ammunition, and other work related military affairs.
- All applications for REACT positions should be made to the responsible authority of the relevant participating State for nomination.
- After nomination by the participating States, and screening by the Secretariat, successful applicants would be added to the REACT list under their field expertise.

4. Finally, **co-operation and co-ordination with other institutions** was considered by Dr. Michael Brzoska from the Bonn International Center for Conversion and by Mr. Roberto Rapaccini from the European Commission (DG for Justice and Home Affairs).

Dr. Brzoska considered that “September 11” and the rising awareness of the dangers of international terrorism confirmed the timeliness and importance of the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Many provisions of the document could contribute to the control of SALW and to the fight against terrorism. He then focused on the opportunities for practical co-operation with other organizations and institutions, particularly considering Section V of the OSCE document. References were made to the EU’s Programme on Conflict Prevention, the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Stability Pact’s Regional Implementation Plan for Combating the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in South East Europe, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 and Counter-Terrorism Committee, among others. The role of NGOs was also highlighted. Dr. Brzoska then turned to the importance of disarmament measures, with a focus on small arms, as an element of peacekeeping, and mentioned the measures offered by some organizations helping with the implementation of SALW related projects.

Mr. Rapaccini emphasized that the special meeting of the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council of 20 September 2001 had led to the adoption of an impressive list of measures to reinforce the fight against terrorism and organized crime. The European Union had signed the Firearms Protocol of the United Nations Palermo Convention on Transnational Crime on 16 January 2002. This Protocol represented a milestone in efforts to control the movement of weapons more effectively and to reduce the potential for their use



for illicit purposes, and to address the broader security considerations in the reinforced fight against terrorism and organized crime. Against this background, the Commission would submit proposals to adapt existing legislation in line with the provisions of United Nations Firearms Protocol. From a security perspective, the Commission was exploring aspects of the illegal trafficking of firearms and explosives from the angle of organized crime and with a view to combating terrorism inside the European Union and beyond. The European Commission considered this Workshop provided a useful opportunity to share information and views.

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In the ensuing **debate** many questions were put to the different speakers. Some related to the lessons learned in the field which might provide an opportunity to improve implementation of the OSCE document on SALW, not only with regard to the destruction of surplus SALW but also concerning disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DD&R) measures. It was generally felt that to better pursue their tasks, the missions would need additional personnel and experts on SALW as well as additional resources. It was also felt that REACT, within the established lines of responsibility, could also make a contribution in this respect. All these measures would also have an impact on the particular subject addressed in the session: the implementation of the OSCE document on SALW and its specific contribution to the fight against terrorism.

The need for better co-ordination with other international organizations and NGOs on the ground was stressed, in view of their important contribution. Many of them had been mentioned in the statement made by Dr. Brzoska.

Some problems relating to surplus ammunition were also raised. The OSCE document did not cover this equipment which was dealt with in a similar way to SALW and posed identical problems on the ground.

Regarding the hand-over of SALW by local populations, it was generally felt that financial compensation was less efficient than amnesties and the promotion of small programmes related e.g. to agriculture or small enterprises.

One delegation pointed out that the discussions had not covered the whole potential of the OSCE Document on SALW. Illicit production and illicit trafficking should also be dealt with, in the context of Chapters 2 and 3 of the document. This represented a problem of major concern since in Transnistria there was a major production of illegal SALW. A gap in the implementation of the document was pointed out, since it would be impossible to report on transfers of SALW if the production was not controlled by state authorities.

Border control was also considered to be a major issue and extremely important in the prevention of the illicit transfer of SALW.

Finally, problems related to the “Gun Culture” were also addressed.

## WORKING SESSION IV

Tuesday, 5 February 2002

### Report of the Working Session Rapporteur

- Agenda item 3.5: Possible further OSCE actions, co-ordination and co-operation with other institutions
- Possible further activities of the OSCE: preparation of future information exchanges (preliminary work on guidelines)
  - Co-ordination and co-operation with the United Nations Programme of Action, and regional initiatives and specific projects
  - Discussion and recommendations
- 

### Further Action

As the OSCE SALW is a living document, no normative issues are raised; the focus instead should be on issues concerning enhanced implementation. These include:

1. The need to **clarify existing commitments**, with a suggestion that participating States should review submissions made for **2001 Information Exchanges**, and consider how to make their respective submissions more comprehensive and perhaps more harmonized. As a means of providing guidance, it was suggested that the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) might prepare a sample model using helpful examples taken from last year's 47 submissions. Regarding the **2002 Information Exchange**, it was suggested that the CPC be tasked with the preparation of a template. The CPC reiterated its offer to co-ordinate assistance to States requesting help. The CPC might consider seconding experts (similar to those funded by Finland and Switzerland for the 2001 Information Exchange) to create the template. Regarding the 2002 submissions, clarification was requested on the item regarding category and sub-category, which were not clearly defined. It was suggested that the weapon type, name, and model should be included. Delegations also noted that excellent examples of national marking systems and photos had been presented in Session II, copies of which might be added to national submissions, thus allowing for more easy recognition of marking systems.
2. The development of **Best Practice Handbooks**: other examples of Best Practice Handbooks already produced by international institutions were noted over the two-day workshop (in fact, only one example was noted). A willingness by the OSCE to build on these existing models would preclude duplication of work; the Chair noted this epitomized good co-operation with other organizations. Discussion from the floor noted the usefulness of a handbook on post-conflict rehabilitation; trying to stem the flow of arms and creating and destroying arms was not enough - we must consider how to fill the void so as to preclude brokers from winning a new batch of arms customers. The handbook should facilitate co-operation between the OSCE and other organizations, and provide practical guidelines to other regions. A delegation noted that the FSC must be asked to provide guidance for the development of such handbooks.

3. An examination of the **role of the Document in combating terrorism** - It was suggested that participating States prepare Food-for-Thought papers on this topic, to allow for further substantive discussion within the working groups and the FSC.
4. The need for future consideration on **how to operationalize Section V of the Document**, which raised institutional questions. One delegation noted that the December 2001 Bishkek Conference on Terrorism had in fact recommended that a group of experts on terrorism should meet.
5. **A roster of SALW experts** to be developed, which incorporated the lists to be provided by other international organizations, and those offered by many of those present. This could be done effectively using the REACT system, which is already operational. The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) is committed to share names of experts for the proposed roster.

## **Expert speakers**

### **(A) United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA):** Dr. Nazir Kamal.

Dr. Kamal enumerated activities related to the **United Nation's Programme of Action** (POA) and the General Assembly Resolution of 2001. Its objectives include:

1. Collate information annually on action to implement POA;
2. Hold biennial conferences, set for 2003 and 2005, which will constitute the preparatory process for the SALW Review Conference in 2006;
3. Undertake a feasibility study on the tracing of illicit SALW;
4. Establish a group of governmental experts (GGE) on marking, with three dedicated sessions starting first in May 2002, with two to follow in 2003. The GGE should report to the 2003 United Nations SALW Biennial Conference;
5. Create a data base which will be more detailed than the voluntary submission of national responses related to the POA. DDA to create a database to incorporate a comprehensive collection of SALW activities at national, regional and local levels.

In the operative paragraphs of the United Nations POA (Section III on International Co-operation), there was no specific reference committing DDA itself to action, but rather to other international organizations. For example, paragraph 6 focused on capacity building. In this regard, the DDA was willing to facilitate assistance for capacity building with regards to the Best Practices Handbook. The United Nations Destruction Handbook had already been distributed within the OSCE.

Regarding outreach projects outside of the OSCE region, the DDA was responding to government requests, (a) from Sri Lanka for weapons collection, with the aim of involving civilian groups; (b) from Kenya for help to Kenya and the East African area; and (c) from

Cambodia, to follow up the SALW workshop (funded by Japan and Canada) which took place there in 2001. In addition, collaboration was taking place with the Hague Appeal for Peace on disarmament education, to develop school programmes for pilot projects in four different countries, including Albania.

Close co-operation between the United Nations DDA and the OSCE was recommended, with a request for substantive help from the OSCE on the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution regarding the carrying out of the POA.

**(B) European Commission Department for External Relations: Gunther Manthey.**

In 1998, the European Union announced a Joint Action on SALW, allowing for financial and technical assistance to countries, international organizations and NGOs, with a total budget of Euro 5.5 million. A total of 8 projects had been financed, with only some of them taking place within the OSCE region, but all with varying degrees of success. However, all 8 projects were relevant for the OSCE in terms of lessons learned. They incorporated regional efforts as follows: SALW collection and destruction (Albania; South Ossetia/Georgia; Mozambique; Cambodia); creation of data bases on firearms, ammunitions and explosives; provision of support tools for the training of police and customs officers (Latin America and the Caribbean); funding of national and international experts to assist in SALW projects (Albania); and establishment of a unique programme for policy development and programme implementation at a multi-sectoral level across all levels of government (Cambodia).

Directly relevant for the OSCE were examples of positive and negative outcomes. A 1991 project in Albania was unsuccessful because the EU aim of arms destruction was countered by the government's wish to use the weapons for its own police or military forces. Considered successful to date was the EU-ASAC Programme for Cambodia, a longer-term project designed to provide assistance for a plethora of activities: preparing an Arms Law; improving record-keeping and safe-storage of military stocks of SALW; destruction of civilian and surplus SALW, including public destruction events; and preparations for appropriate arms management and disposal during demobilization processes.

Recent efforts had begun in the EC to streamline the approach to the SALW problem, recognizing that additional financial means were needed, especially after the adoption of the United Nations SALW POA. However, OSCE countries remained eligible for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) funding for SALW projects.

**(C) NATO Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)-Albania Ammunition Destruction: Yves Beaulieu, MFA, Canada.**

The United Nations POA as well as the OSCE document were important in catalysing the global community to combat the threat of SALW. They were effective at the national, subregional and international levels, and the momentum continued. Canada identified interlocking tracks: implementing the POA and OSCE document; advancing the work on initiatives not finished in 2001; ensuring complementarity and transparency at global and regional levels; and building a comprehensive approach which incorporates the human security dimension.

Together with NGOs and other partners, Canada was spearheading a concrete destruction project, namely the NATO-EAPC destruction of ammunition in Albania. Under the umbrella of the EAPC's Project for Peace, SALW projects could be established in partner countries of the EAPC. While the NATO Maintenance Supply Agency (NAMSA) acted as the executing agency, the Office for Financial Control would manage the project which needed \$8 million. Half of this sum must be pledged before project could begin. The project takes four years. Three trust fund projects had been established to date, two by Canada, and one by the Netherlands.

Working with other partners, (including the Stability Pact), Canada funded NAMSA to create a project proposal, which was presented to the Partnership for Peace (PfP) in Brussels on 21 January 2002. NAMSA is responsible for carrying out the project and for verifying the destruction activity.

Other recent Canadian initiatives included regional workshops to identify regional implementation activities defined as being under the umbrella of the UN POA. These included: Central America (San Jose, Costa Rica) December 2001, co-sponsored with Finland and Costa Rica; Africa (Pretoria, South Africa) March 2002, with ten co-sponsors including some OSCE participating States; and South-East Asia (Manila, Philippines) April 2002. Another workshop in Europe was planned for 2002.

Through the OSCE process, Canada co-funded the Central Asian SALW training workshops, and anticipated the outcome of the regional follow-up meeting in spring 2002. Canada had also commissioned a study on the impact of small arms on children entitled "*Putting Children First: Building a Framework for International Action to Address the Impact of Small Arms on Children*", produced by the NGO Saferworld.

**(D) Sealing the OSCE Border against external SALW flows, and Stemming the Related Threats:** Alfiya Musina, MFA, Uzbekistan.

The campaign against the illicit transfer of SALW had become the object of international attention. In the framework of the OSCE, participating States had developed control instruments to avoid the illicit spread of SALW. The events of 11 September 2001 highlighted the need to take steps to control the illegal production of SALW and ammunition, one of the central goals in the fight against terrorism. Marking its commitment to this fight, Uzbekistan had signed all twelve international terrorism conventions. In highlighting the negative impacts of SALW, Uzbekistan suggested a proposal to establish an arms embargo for Afghanistan.

The spread of weapons from Afghanistan was noted as being directly related to threats in the region, including current efforts to achieve stability within that country. A consistent approach was required to prevent the Afghan conflict spreading beyond its borders. However, huge stockpiles in Afghan gathered over the last 20 years could lead to new localized military actions. Experts had shown that there were millions of SALW and heavy equipment in Afghanistan, a considerable portion of which was in the hands of uncontrolled groups as well as civilians. Armed conflict could in fact lead to an escalation of the Afghan war.

The initial process of stabilization in Afghan must match efforts to control this huge amount of ordnance. By way of implementing the United Nations POA, Uzbekistan called upon the OSCE to work closely with the United Nations, and help to bolster the southern borders of OSCE. Participating States were challenged to consider the real requirements of security within the whole of the OSCE region. Proper monitoring of SALW in the region required an overall system of arms control; proactive and co-ordinated efforts by both United Nations and OSCE structures would help to develop practical results.

**(E) Conflict Prevention Centre:** Kate Joseph.

The CPC noted that the OSCE can make a contribution to the SALW effort in project-based work. Training workshops in Central Asia represent the first concrete project designed to assist participating States with implementation of certain provisions of the SALW Document. That workshop project (sponsored by Canada, the Netherlands and Switzerland) proved useful for information sharing and allowed the OSCE to learn about the region and what its real challenges are. The sensitive conflict situation in Afghanistan was noted, as well as the implications for OSCE border-States. More concrete work is recommended, especially assistance for border control and stockpile security and management. It appears that many countries are willing to provide funds, but all SALW projects must be supported by the implementation of broader norms and principles of OSCE, including good governance and respect for human rights.

Work with other international organizations is key to develop joint activities and learn from their experiences, especially outside of the OSCE region. The CPC, along with donor countries, could facilitate specialized training in securing and destroying weapons stockpiles. The focus should extend beyond just one sub-region, noting the many OSCE subregions where work is required (and not only where OSCE field missions exist).

The FSC will be focused on best practice guides and templates for information exchanges in order to determine path of implementation. Information exchanges to take up more of our time, and there is an obvious need for an update of 2001 submissions. OSCE participating States are encouraged to provide updates, and develop more detailed outlines or model answers, which FSC will have to consider. The 2002 exchange is challenging, and will require considerable effort in capitals, and the FSC will to develop templates to facilitate in this regard.

## **Co-ordination and co-operation with the international organizations**

### **United Nations Centre for International Crime Prevention, United Nations Office for Drugs Control and Crime Prevention (UNODCCP):** Chris Ram.

The United Nations was seeking to encourage greater co-operation on the signature and ratification of the United Nations Protocol on Firearms, which had only 28 signatures to date. The events of 11 September 2001 had prompted more countries to sign. Regional seminars had been successful in trying to identify countries' needs. The efforts of the OSCE related to commitments made to its SALW document would provide welcome support. The Crime Prevention Centre was prepared to provide help on marking and record keeping, and

should be collaborating in areas where expertise could be shared. The OSCE Document was broadly consistent with parameters of the Protocol, and the OSCE should urge participating States to sign it. A plea for assistance was made in assessing the needs of OSCE countries to help them to ratify. The United Nations office could provide additional information in four languages (English, French, Spanish, and Russian), and could provide experts on criminal legislation. The Centre's study on explosives trafficking would be available by mid-February 2002.

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - Mikael Griffon.**

The spirit in which NATO works was based on the complementary efforts of the OSCE and UN, thus allowing NATO to be purely operational and to focus on grassroots efforts. The Canadian-led project was cited as an excellent concrete example, where real value could be added by NATO's activities. The Partnership for Peace's Co-operation programme focused on three kinds of action: general training; stockpile management, and destruction, drawing on the competence of specialized agencies. Tailor-made projects were set up with specific Trust Funds.

NATO also promoted commitments taken on in other areas, such as the OSCE Baku seminar on the implementation of commitments made in June 2001. In the context of the EAPC, NATO tried to stress information exchange among the 46 member states.

**International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) - Lena Eskeland.**

The ICRC's focus on humanitarian issues justified its concern about the international community's lack of common indicators for arms purchasers who did not comply with international humanitarian law. The ICRC's list of indicators could be incorporated into OSCE participating States' individual national codes of conduct.

**United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) - Marybeth McKeevor.**

Possible areas of co-operation with the OSCE included human security and development, whose very survival were contingent upon successful dealing with SALW proliferation. UNDP had a three-phase project in Albania, with a SALW control project and a research facility as part of a regional early warning system. In supporting human security projects in Macedonia, Kosovo, Georgia, and Albania, some of the lessons learned had been negative, but had helped to improve work in the future. This OSCE SALW workshop had shown ample scope for co-operation in information sharing, techniques and procedures for destruction, and the provision of technical assistance. UNDP had pledged to continue to work with multi-sectoral partners to meet its aims of human development and security.

**Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe - Andrew Hyde.**

The Stability Pact had a facilitative role in SALW in building subregional consensus on what could be done. A regional implementation plan was made available at workshop, which established a regional clearing house in Budapest of SALW activities; a regional steering group with NGOs and others; and a national focal point for each member country to respond to the regional implementation plan. Outreach to beneficiary countries was also key, in order to meet the objectives of the OSCE document. The Stability Pact worked on project

development, considering donor norms and focusing on trans-border awareness. NGOs played an important role, and would be members of the clearing house to help facilitate the involvement of local NGOs and governments. These collective efforts formed a logical follow-on to frameworks established by the OSCE and United Nations.

**Saferworld** - United Kingdom - Bernardo Mariani.

Mr. Mariani highlighted the need for greater co-operation between governmental and non-governmental sectors in dealing with SALW. NGOs could play an important role in convening meetings, such as the Szeged small arms process, in order to comprehensively address the problems of SALW within a specific region. Research done by NGOs could be a primary resource for government action, e.g., the *Biting the Bullet* series. When collection projects were conducted in co-operation with a country, these were much more successful. When the forces of police and community services were combined, they complemented each other's work. Public education and awareness raising also made a difference, such as high-profile destruction projects (Rio event 2001). Civil society actors and local NGOs had made substantial contributions to combating the proliferation of illicit SALW. To provide guidance to other groups, Saferworld would develop resource manuals for NGOs interested in combating SALW proliferation.

**Eminent Persons Group on Curbing Illicit Trafficking in SALW (International)** - Russian Federation - Ambassador G. Berdennikov.

During the first Working Session, the EPG made a plea for OSCE participating States not to make SALW transfers to non-State actors. In noting its efforts to facilitate dialogue between governments and arms manufacturers, the EPG claimed to lobby industry to develop marking standards. The group also declared its pursuit of the Paris process on voluntary measures for norms and SALW tracing, and announced its support for post-conflict DDR.

## **Projects**

A joint French-Swiss tracing project, to define the key tools for tracing, marking and the movement of SALW. Mutual assistance between States to be discussed to ensure marking was done at national levels, with the establishment of a technical commission to study possible development of marking. Preliminary contacts to take place over the next months, with a pilot group to be created and a document prepared. These efforts should be complementary to the September 2002 governmental conference in Geneva, and ought to be related to the United Nations Experts Group. The collective aim was to establish parameters for an international tool. More international exchanges of information were required regarding the illicit flow of SALW.

Sweden highlighted the 'Way Ahead' and the operationalization of Section V, supporting the practical proposals put forward by the Finnish expert Riitta Korpivaara to use the REACT process and draw on national and international data banks of experts. Sweden proposed to host a meeting of OSCE Field Missions, interested beneficiaries, and those countries willing to provide experts, to discuss how to determine more realistic REACT profiles, and how to identify gaps in REACT with respect to SALW experts. CPC offered to host such a meeting. Canada made an appeal for additional funding support to the CPC in



order to enhance its ability to respond to SALW challenges and to consider the tools which the OSCE would need to operationalize its efforts to use the SALW document to combat terrorism. The EU-Canada meeting in May 2001 recommended additional work regarding national capacity and stocks, which the OSCE might consider as a future project.

The USA made an offer of technical help in destruction projects, and noted the joint Romania project, supported by Romania, Norway and the USA.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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**344th Plenary Meeting**  
FSC Journal No. 350, Agenda item 3

**DECISION No. 8/01  
AGENDA, MODALITIES AND TENTATIVE TIMETABLE  
FOR A WORKSHOP ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OSCE  
DOCUMENT ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW)**

(Vienna, 4 to 5 February 2002)

**1. Context**

As agreed in the OSCE SALW Document (FSC.DOC/1/00, 24 November 2000), the first information exchanges on SALW issues took place on 30 June 2001. These exchanges must now be reviewed by the OSCE participating States, which are also preparing for further information exchanges, scheduled for 30 June 2002.

Both information exchanges will, for the first time, allow participating States to have a clearer picture of the implementation of the OSCE SALW Document. On the basis of the information exchanged, States could be in a position to draw up "best practice" guidelines.

Section V of the SALW Document is designed to integrate OSCE's SALW initiatives into the Organization's wider efforts in respect of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. Implementation of this Section is therefore of particular importance and will require attention at the Workshop.

In the context of contributing to the OSCE's Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, this Workshop will also help look at ways in which the commitments made in the OSCE SALW Document that are of relevance in the fight against terrorism can be put into practice.

**2. Objectives**

The overall objectives of the Workshop are:

- To assist the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) to improve its, and participating States to improve their, activities in respect of SALW;
- To contribute to full, correct and continuing implementation.

Concrete objectives that will be dealt with in the Workshop are:

- To study national answers submitted for the first exchange of information and the “lessons learned” from them;
- To identify the possible structure of a “best practice” handbook on small arms and DD and R measures;
- To explore how this Document and its further implementation can contribute to the fight against terrorism and organized crime;
- To identify what forms of assistance could be used to improve the implementation by participating States;
- To discuss how requests for monitoring of the destruction of small arms and technical assistance can best be co-ordinated through the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC);
- To suggest possible guidelines/recommendations for the future information exchanges that will take place annually from June 2002;
- To explore the steps the OSCE (Permanent Council/FSC) needs to undertake in order to further improve implementation and to explore areas of possible co-operation with other organizations.

### **3. Tentative agenda**

#### **3.1 Opening plenary: Preparing the ground**

- Opening address
  - Chairperson of the FSC
- Introductory remarks, goals of the Workshop
  - Chairperson of the Workshop

#### **3.2 Working session I: Review of the first information exchange**

- Presentation of the review and analysis of the first information exchange
- Aspects: Overview of main features, recommendations, lessons learned
- Discussion and recommendations
  - Representative of the CPC (seconded expert)

### **3.3 Working session II: Review of specific issues for developing “best practices”**

- National marking systems
- Procedures for the control of the manufacture of SALW
- Relevant national legislation and current practices regarding export policy, procedures and documentation; and control over international brokering in SALW
- Effective stockpile management and security, and techniques and procedures for destruction of SALW, including the work of other international organizations and institutions
- Co-ordination of possible technical assistance through the CPC (including techniques and procedures for destruction)
- Possible structure of a “best practice” handbook on small arms measures, and modalities for its development
- Discussion and recommendations
  - One expert for each topic

### **3.4 Working session III: Implementation of the Document and its possible contribution to combating terrorism**

- Implementation of the measures set forth in the Document (especially Section V)
- Role of relevant OSCE institutions
- Discuss the establishment of a team of experts to assist participating States; possible use of REACT to provide these experts
- Co-operation and co-ordination with other institutions
  - Experts, representative of the CPC
- Discussion and recommendations

### **3.5 Working session IV: Possible further OSCE actions, co-ordination and co-operation with other institutions**

- Possible further activities of the OSCE: preparation of future information exchanges (preliminary work on guidelines)
  - Chairman of the FSC or representative of the CPC

- Co-ordination and co-operation with the United Nations Programme of Action, and regional initiatives and specific projects
  - United Nations representative and representatives of other international organizations
- Discussion and recommendations

### **3.6 Closing plenary**

- Reports by the rapporteurs
- Final discussion
- Summary of major findings/recommendations for future work/initiatives
  - Chairperson of the Workshop

## **4. Organizational modalities**

The Workshop is intended for delegations, experts and representatives from relevant ministries and security-related organizations/institutions dealing with the issue of SALW.

The Presidency of the Workshop is to be decided upon pending further consultations.

Presentations made during the Workshop should be in the form of clear assessments of the actual implementation situation and should contain proposals for further implementation actions.

The expert seconded to the CPC will devote special attention to the conceptual preparation of the working sessions.

Delegations are invited to submit proposals for experts, working session chairpersons and rapporteurs. The closing date for proposals is 6 January 2002.

Possible timetable:

	DAY 1	DAY 2
Morning (10 a.m. - 1 p.m.)	Opening plenary/ Working session I	Working sessions III/IV
Afternoon (3 p.m. - 6 p.m.)	Working sessions II/III	Working session IV Closing plenary

**LOG OF CONTRIBUTIONS  
TO THE WORKSHOP ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OSCE  
DOCUMENT ON SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS**

(Vienna, 4 and 5 February 2002)

Doc. id. No.	Date	Originator	Title	Language
<b>I. Plenary Sessions</b>				
FSC.DEL/57/02	1.2.02	Spain-European Union	EU contribution to the Small Arms and Light Weapons Workshop	E
FSC.DEL/57/02/ Corr.1	1.2.02	Spain-European Union	EU contribution to the Small Arms and Light Weapons Workshop	E
FSC.DEL/59/02	4.2.02	Russian Federation	Eminent Persons Group	E
FSC.DEL/83/02	5.2.02	United Kingdom	Report of the Rapporteur of Working Session I	E
FSC.DEL/84/02	5.2.02	USA/Switzerland	Report of the Rapporteur of Working Session II	E
FSC.DEL/85/02	5.2.02	Portugal	Report of the Rapporteur of Working Session III	E
FSC.DEL/86/02	13.2.02	Canada	Report of the Rapporteur of Working Session IV	E
FSC.DEL/99/02	19.2.02	Czech Republic	Chairperson's Report	E
<b>II. Working Sessions</b>				
<b>Working Session I</b>				
<b>Review of the first information exchange</b>				
None				
<b>Working Session II</b>				
<b>Review of specific issues for developing "best practices"</b>				
FSC.DEL/60/02	4.2.02	ICRC	Statement	E
FSC.DEL/62/02	4.2.02	USA	Expert Speaker: Mr. Gary Thomas (Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms)	E
FSC.DEL/63/02	4.2.02	Russian Federation	Expert Speaker: Mr. Piotr Litavrin (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	E/R
FSC.DEL/66/02	4.2.02	Russian Federation	Expert Speaker: Colonel Oleg Skabara (Ministry of Defence)	E/R
FSC.DEL/71/02	4.2.02	USA	Expert Speaker: Lieutenant Colonel Craig Bollenberg (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff)	E
FSC.DEL/73/02	4.2.02	Norway	Expert Speaker: Ms. Audhild Nydal (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	E
FSC.DEL/77/02	5.2.02	Czech Republic	Expert Speaker: Mr. Richard Macha (Ministry of Defence)	E
FSC.DEL/78/02	5.2.02	Germany	Expert Speaker: Mr. Christopher Monreal (Federal Export Control Office)	E
FSC.DEL/79/02	5.2.02	Germany	Expert Speaker: Lieutenant-Colonel Kurt Bull (German Verification Centre)	E
FSC.DEL/82/02	5.2.02	Kazakhstan	Statement	E/R
FSC.DEL/88/02	5.2.02	Azerbaijan	Statement	E

Doc. id. No.	Date	Originator	Title	Language
<b>Working Session III</b>				
<b>Implementation of the Document and its possible contribution to combating terrorism</b>				
FSC.FR/1/02	4.2.02	OSCE Mission to FRY	Expert Speaker: Dr. Vladimir Bilandzic (CSBM Special Advisor)	E
FSC.FR/2/02	5.2.02	OSCE Mission to Georgia	Expert Speaker: Mr. Jozsef Deak (Military Adviser)	E
FSC.FR/3/02	7.2.02	OSCE Presence in Albania	Expert Speaker: Mr. Philip Figgins (Field Station Co-ordinator)	E
FSC.DEL/69/02	4.2.02	Germany	Study Proposal: Disposing of Surplus Small Arms (Bonn International Centre for Conversion)	E
FSC.DEL/72/02	5.2.02	Finland	Expert Speaker: Ms. Riitta Korpivaara (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)	E
FSC.DEL/74/02	5.2.02	European Commission	Expert Speaker: Mr. Roberto Rapaccini (Director General for Justice and Home Affairs)	E
FSC.DEL/75/02	5.2.02	Germany	Expert Speaker: Dr. Michael Brozka (Bonn International Centre for Conversion)	E
<b>Working Session IV</b>				
<b>Possible further OSCE actions, co-ordination and co-operation with other institutions</b>				
FSC.DEL/64/02	4.2.02	Stability Pact	Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan	E
FSC.DEL/67/02	4.2.02	Uzbekistan	Statement	E/R
FSC.DEL/68/02	4.2.02	Canada	Proposal to Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade for Destruction of Ammunition for SALW in Albania	E
FSC.DEL/70/02	4.2.02	Canada	Expert Speaker: Yves Beaulieu (IDA)	E
FSC.DEL/80/02	5.2.02	Sweden	Statement	E
FSC.DEL/81/02	5.2.02	European Commission	Expert Speaker: Director General for External Relations	E
<b>III. Other</b>				
SEC.INF/22/02	23.1.02	Conferences Services	Information Circular No.2	E
FSC.INF/3/02/ Rev.1	5.2.02	Conference Services	Final List of Participants for the Seminar	E
FSC.DEL/46/02/ Rev.2	4.2.02	Czech Republic	List of speakers, chairpersons and rapporteurs	E