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Date d'insertion : 19/07/2005

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Export controls on production capacities for military equipment:

Strengthening the EU approach

Holger Anders, researcher for GRIP and IANSA

19 July 2005

This report was written for the International Action Network on Small Arms and for GRIP as part of the programme ‘Observatory on global weapons production and transfers’ by the Walloon Region, Belgium. The author would like to thank the contacted governmental officials and representatives of companies in the defence industry in Germany, France, and Belgium, who assisted him in this research. The here presented opinions are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Walloon Region or the contacted ministries and companies. Any remaining errors are his. 

1. Introduction

European Union member states are expected to adopt in the near future a revised EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports to further develop and strengthen their co-operation in the area of export controls on military equipment. One expected development is a tightening of the Code’s standards related to limiting the risk of diversions of military equipment. In particular, the revised Code will strengthen standards for the assessment of diversion risks in relation to exports of production capacities and finished goods derived from these. This includes capacities exported for the purposes of licensed production of military equipment in third countries. The revised Code will thereby address an issue area that has long been identified by arms control advocates as requiring greater scrutiny and governmental efforts.

This paper assesses the expected advances in controls on exports of production capacities under the renamed EU Code of Conduct on Exports of Military Equipment. The paper starts by highlighting the particular proliferation risks associated with exports of production capacities. It then turns to a review of good practices in national and multilateral counter-proliferation policies in Europe. It is argued that the revised Code makes important and welcome advances but falls short of existing good practices and requirements in several aspects. Further, there is significant scope for strengthening co-operation between EU member states to assist in responsible licensing for exports of production capacities for military equipment.

The paper recommends that EU member states further develop common understandings on export controls on military production capacities. In particular, the revised EU Code should be complemented with a common understanding that exports of production capacities will be subject to strict end-use conditions, including mandatory end user and end-use declarations and sanctions for violations thereof. Further, EU member states should consider developing guidelines to assist national export authorities in the responsible implementation of the revised EU Code’s provisions to limit diversion risks.

2. Proliferation risks associated with capacity transfers 

Production capacities for military equipment cover technology and equipment required for the manufacture of components or fully assembled conventional arms and ammunition. Exports of production capacities, including deals for licensed production of military equipment abroad, are a well established practice in the international arms market. For example, more than 90 % of production facilities in the world for small arms and light weapons (SALW) ammunition for military and law enforcement markets are estimated to be equipped with production and assembly lines provided by companies in Germany, France, and Belgium. [1]

On the supply side, governments may have an interest to support political allies in efforts to establish, maintain, or modernise domestic arms industries. In addition, there may be commercial interests by providers of production equipment and technology to open up foreign markets and establish the specific good in these markets. 

To illustrate, the Belgian FN Herstal, a principal global producer of small arms and light weapons, operates production facilities in Belgium, the USA, and Portugal. In addition, it has entered into licensed production deals or supported foreign producers with technology and production equipment in more than 20 Latin American, African, and South-East Asian countries. [2] FN Herstal itself was formed in 1889 to produce 150,000 infantry rifles for the Belgian armed forces under license from the German Mauser Werke. [3]

Similarly, the German Heckler & Koch (H&K) has had its popular G3 assault rifle being produced in, next to its German, British, and US production facilities, under license in more than 15 countries in Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and Far East, as well as South-East Asia. [4]

On the demand side, many governments prefer a domestic capacity for the production of the models and types of arms and weapons employed by the national armed  forces. The USA, for example, has consistently required that military small arms based on foreign designs and employed by the US armed forces are produced domestically. [5] Some states may also have an interest to establish or upgrade their domestic production capacities so as to actively participate in the international arms market.

2.1 Relation between transfers of production equipment and diversion risks

Regrettably, the increase in the number of manufacturers of military equipment over the last decades, which is largely the result of transfers of production capacity, has also led to an increase in the number of potential sources of arms proliferation. In particular, production centres may be located in states, which have not in place control systems that ensure the responsible management of military equipment. This can greatly contribute to diversions from production centres, stockpiles, and during transfers. In addition, recipient countries may not abide to given end-use declarations, where these were required, and re-export production capacities or export finished goods to undesirable recipients.

2.1.1 The case of AK assault rifle

The relation between transfers of production capacities and proliferation risks, especially insofar as related to SALW, can be illustrated with the example of the Kalashnikov assault rifle (AK). This rifle type was originally designed in the 1940s in the Soviet Union. By now, the AK has more than 160 derivatives and is “the world’s most widely distributed single weapon model”. While no longer produced in its country of origin, rifles of the AK family have been produced in 19 countries, and “estimates of the total number of AKs in circulation range as high as 100 million”. [6] Importantly, this widely chosen instrument of violence in armed conflicts is produced beyond any control by the Russian Federation. This has been made possible by, among other, a lack of efforts by Soviet Union officials to strictly controls transfers of production designs for AK rifles. 

2.1.2 Experiences of Germany

A further illustrative example is the experience by Germany. It actively supported in the 1960s and 70s the build-up of domestic production capacities in newly independent states to allow these to meet their national security needs. This included the build-up of small arms production capacities in Pakistan and Iran through the authorisation of licensed production deals for the H&K assault rifle G3. The deals were conditional on these weapons being only for domestic consumption by national armed forces. [7] However, subsequent regime changes in these countries resulted in new governments, which considered themselves no longer bound by end-use obligations given by the preceding regimes. 

Germany now faces the situation that weapons from production centres it once helped build are finding their way into armed conflict and crime. For example, in 2001, Pakistan reportedly transferred domestically produced H&K assault rifles to Sri Lanka. Germany would not have been likely to authorise an export this equipment to Sri Lanka at that time. [8] Similarly, Iran is reputed to be a source of assault rifle proliferation based on production capacities once imported by Germany. Also, in March 2003, the Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic was assassinated with a H&K sniper rifle. The analysis of the rifle by the German federal criminal police revealed that it had been pieced together from components produced in several countries abroad that previously imported German production capacities. [9]

2.2 Risks of diversion associated with exports of production capacities

It deserves emphasis that there exist proliferation concerns regarding exports of production capacities, which are broader than those related to exports of finished components or fully assembled military equipment. That is, the establishment, maintenance, or upgrading of production facilities abroad implies the risk not only of diversion of a finite number of exported finished goods, but of contributing to sources of continued diversions for decades to come. This risk is especially pronounced with regards to production centres for ammunition for SALW. That is, while a diverted SALW may be (mis-)used on a repeated basis, diverted ammunition will generally be (mis-)used only once. This implies a continued demand for illicit SALW ammunition by those who cannot acquire required ammunition on the legal arms markets. Poorly controlled production centres for SALW ammunition can consequently become proliferation sources of particular concern. 

2.2.1 Limited options for post-export controls

Further, there is the critical issue of limited control options by exporting states regarding the compliance by end users with end-use assurance where these were required. For example, with no control over output and transfers by SALW production centres Germany once helped established, Germany’s scope for measures to counter proliferation from these centres is largely restricted to denying transfers of machine spare parts. This has reportedly led to a diminution of the quality of the weapons derived from the production capacities originally transferred by Germany, though not a stop of production.

Another example is given by efforts by Belgium and other foreign officials to inspect the Eldoret production facility for SALW and SALW ammunition in Kenya. This facility was established with the help of Belgian companies in the mid and late 1990s. So far however outside inspections of the Eldoret facility to verify compliance with Kenyan end-use assurances have not been granted by the Kenyan government [see Box 1].        

Box 1: The Eldoret case

The importance of adequate national control measures in recipient countries is underlined by the example of the Kenyan Eldoret facility. The facility was equipped in the 1990s by FN Herstal for the manufacture of military small arms ammunition. The Kenyan government provided the Belgian authorities with written assurances that ammunition produced at this plant will not be exported to belligerent parties in the Great Lakes region.

There remains concern however that Kenya has not yet in place a national control system allowing national authorities to enforce this assurance. Thus, there have been repeated accusations that ammunition produced at Eldoret found its way onto illicit regional markets.[1] Concern is further sustained by the fact that the reported annual output capacity of 20 million rounds at Eldoret greatly exceeds the national defence requirements of the Kenyan armed forces of an estimated two to three million rounds.[2]

In addition, current levels of transparency in Kenya on actual production output, transfers and end users of ammunition produced at Eldoret are low. They do not allow for adequate scrutiny by the Kenyan parliament, Kenya’s civil society, and others of the government’s production and transfer practices. They therefore also do not allow for independent verification that ammunition coming from Eldoret is responsibly managed and secured against diversions.

1. See, for example, Amnesty International (2004) Undermining Global Security. London, AI, p.35f.
2. see East African (2003) Kenya Will Not Close Eldoret Bullet Factory, Says Murungaru. Available at , accessed 22 April 2005.

2.2.1 Risks of diversion of production capacities and reverse engineering

One particular diversion risk associated with transfers of production capacities relates to the diversion of the capacities themselves. For example, an importer of production machinery and designs may re-transfer the capacities to undesirable third parties. Further, designs for production equipment may be duplicated by the recipient through cloning or reverse-engineering. South Africa, for example, is reported to have cloned imported production equipment for SALW ammunition so as to increase national output capacities and mitigate the effects of the arms embargo that was imposed on South Africa’s past apartheid regime. [10] Such cloning of equipment and construction designs based on well-established production technologies does not pose significant technical challenges and requires little apart from trained engineers. 

2.2.2 Risks of diversion of finished goods 

Importantly, transfers of production capacities can imply risks of diversions of finished goods derived from the imported technology or equipment. In particular, a risk exists that recipient states do not have in place the domestic controls and mechanisms required to ensure the responsible management of goods derived from imported production capacities. Responsible management entails, among other, the existence of adequately mandated, trained and equipped national authorities; adequate record-keeping requirements for manufacturers and subsequent domestic recipients of finished goods; appropriate stockpile security measures; and physical verification of records and production, stockpiles and transfers. These measures are essential to combat diversions of finished goods through loss, theft, neglect, or corruption. [11]

As mentioned, importers may also export finished goods to end users considered as undesirable by the state which transferred the production capacities. For example, in 1999, the Turkish state-owned enterprise MKEK exported 500 submachine guns, manufactured as part of a British licensed production deal, to the Indonesian police. The transfer took place at a time when the UK would most likely not have granted an export of such weapons to Indonesia. [12] Further, importers may flaunt assurances given to the authorities of the exporting state regarding the end use of the derived finished goods. An early example was given by FN Herstal, when it continued in the 1890s to produce Mauser rifles beyond the original production deal. [13]  

3. European export standards to limit risks of diversions    

3.1 EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports 

A key element in European counter-proliferation policies is provided by the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. Adopted in 1998, the Code’s criterion seven stipulates that member states will consider when assessing export licenses the ‘existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or re-exported under undesirable conditions’. Specifically, member states will consider elements such as the ‘legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country’; ‘the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment’; and the ‘capability of the recipient country to exercise effective export controls’. [14]

This commitment was complemented in 2002 by an agreement among EU member states on the principle that the proliferation of the technology and means to produce military equipment requires special attention. This included an agreement to consider when assessing licenses for exports of production capacities ‘the potential use of the finished product in the country of production and of the risk that the finished product might be diverted or exported to an undesirable end user’. [15]

3.1.1 Expected advances under the revised EU Code on Arms Exports

The revised EU Code of Conduct on Exports of Military Equipment is expected to considerably strengthen standards in the EU on export licensing for items on the EU Common Military List. In particular, the revised EU Code is expected to clearly stipulate that applications for licensed production overseas will be assessed in the same way as license applications for physical transfers, that is, against the criteria of the EU Code. [16]

Further, the principle would be codified that member states not only assess the risk of diversion regarding exported production equipment, but also of the derived finished goods. This would be coupled with the principle of prior knowledge by exporting states of the end user and end-use of the equipment and derived goods. In addition, member states would commit to assessing additional elements when assessing diversion risks for exported equipment. [17] The additional elements would include the record of the recipient country in respecting given end-use assurances, the risk that exported items would be diverted to individual terrorists, and the risk of reverse-engineering. [18]   

3.2 OSCE Document on SALW 

As states member to the 2000 OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, EU member states also committed to not licensing export licenses for SALW if “there is a clear risk that the small arms in question might … be either re-sold (or otherwise diverted) within the recipient country or reexported” under undesirable conditions. This covers exports of technology for the design and production of small arms and light weapons. Importantly, OSCE member states committed to take into account for export licensing “the stockpile management and security procedures of a potential recipient country”. [19]

Further, member states committed to “make every effort … that licensing agreements for small arms production concluded with manufacturers located outside their territory will contain, where appropriate, a clause applying the [criteria stipulated in the OSCE Document on SALW] to any exports of small arms manufactured under licence in that agreement.” [20]

3.3 OSCE Principles on export controls on MANPADS

Even more specific are the controls for transfers of production capacities EU member states committed to under the OSCE Principles for Export Controls of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS). These principles were adopted in 2004 in recognition of the particular threats posed by posed by proliferation and misuse of MANPADS. The controls stipulated in these principles apply to, among other, transfers of capacities for the development, production, assembly, maintenance and operation of MANPADS.

In particular, transfers of production capacities will only be authorised to foreign governments and on the condition of an end user certificate containing a clause prohibiting re-exports without prior consent. [21] Further, exporting governments will take into account the “potential for diversion or misuse in the recipient country; the recipient government’s ability and willingness to protect against unauthorized re-transfers, loss, theft and diversion; and the adequacy and effectiveness of the physical security arrangements of the recipient government for the protection of military property, facilities, holdings, and inventories.” [22]

3.4 National controls in EU member states

In response to increased concern about the easy availability for undesirable end users of SALW and other military equipment, many states have adopted on national levels strengthened export standards for production capacities. For example, France is reputed to have significantly restricted in recent years the range of permissible export destinations for production equipment for SALW and SALW ammunition. This has had important ramifications for the main French provider of SALW ammunition production equipment. With its range of permissible destinations increasingly restricted, the company is adopting an increasing focus on servicing established clients in countries considered by French export authorities to be in a position to adequately ensure responsible national management of derived finished goods. [23]    

3.4.1 Control standards in Germany

Good practices are also found in Germany. It tightened its relevant controls in its Political Guidelines for the Export of Military Equipment of 19 January 2000. [24] In particular, exports of ‘weapons of war’ and related production capacities are, as a matter of principle, only granted to governmental end users in European Union or NATO member states, or ‘NATO-equated’ countries, that is Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland and Japan. In addition, the guidelines specify that the ability of the recipient country to exercise effective export controls on the technology or production equipment as well as of derived goods will be considered according to strict standards. [25]

Germany reaffirmed this restrictive policy in 2003 by stating that export licenses for technology and production equipment are denied, as a matter of principle, where the export would open new production lines for small arms and ammunition in non-EU, NATO or ‘NATO-equated’ countries. [26]

Further, Germany requires an end-use certificate identifying the end user and end-use of derived finished goods. Signatories of these declarations must commit to neither pass on to another company transferred production capacities nor to make related production knowledge available to third parties. Signatories must further commit to neither re-export imported production capacities nor to export derived goods without written approval of the German authorities. [27]

Similarly to the main French provider of SALW ammunition equipment, the main German provider of such equipment has been forced by the new and more restrictive German export policies to downscale its operations and focus on the supply of established clients in countries considered by German export authorities to be able to ensure compliance with end-use assurances. [28]  

4. Scope for further development of European standards  

Recent efforts by states to strengthen counter-proliferation standards in their arms export controls are a welcome development. In particular, the revised EU Code of Conduct on Export of Military Equipment makes important advances by firmly integrating exports of production capacities into broader export controls on military equipment; by specifying in greater detail the elements to be considered in the assessment of risks of diversions; and by coupling such exports with the principle of prior knowledge of the end user of both the production capacities and the derived goods.

Despite advances though, the revised Code still falls short of certain existing good practices adopted by EU member states in relation to for example SALW and particularly MANPADS. For example, the revised Code will not stipulate the need to assess the recipient country’s ability and willingness to protect against unauthorised re-transfers, loss, theft and diversion. The revised Code will further fail to stipulate the need to assess the adequacy and effectiveness of the physical security arrangements of the recipient country for the protection of military property, facilities, holdings, and inventories. Also, no reference is made to the emerging minimal standard that transfers of production capacities will be conditional on strict end user obligations regarding the production capacities and goods derived from these.     

4.1 Facilitating risk assessment at licensing stage        

A fundamental problem often faced by national export authorities is a lack of readily available and reliable information on the end user and end-use for production capacities and derived goods. Regrettably, there seems a tendency at times to make up the lack of information by emphasising that the recipient has given end-use assurances regarding the production equipment and derived finished goods. However, it would seem ill-advised to scrutinise at the licensing stage only a recipient’s willingness to conform to end-use obligations, but not also the recipient’s capacity to ensure compliance with the obligations. ‘Merely’ requiring an end user certificate without further obtaining relevant information of the recipient’s situation therefore seems hardly sufficient.

Where border-line cases are concerned, national authorities should either not grant the license on precautionary grounds, or seek relevant information more proactively than often seems the case. Facilitating adequate assessments by national authorities of diversion risks could entail guidelines on how to assess elements such as a recipient’s country capability to exert effective export controls. Other elements, such as assessing the recipient’s capability to prevent undesirable diversions, could also be usefully elaborated on. In addition, states should make greater use of their capacities to undertake thorough pre-licensing checks for exports of production capacities [see Box 2]. It would also be desirable that member states share experiences of their national experiences in such risk assessment.  

Box 2: Use of expert missions at licensing stage

One recent example for thorough checks at the licensing stage was given by the government of the Walloon Region in Belgium in the context of an export license application for a production line for SALW ammunition to Tanzania.[1] The end user of the production line, the Tanzanian Ministry of Defence, had previously sought to upgrade its existing production capacities through the import of production equipment from Germany and Belgium. The federal export authorities in both countries though denied a license in 2000 and 2003 respectively. The export authorities of the Walloon Region then received an essentially identical export license application in 2004.

The border-line case of Tanzania

The export application can be seen to fall in the category of border-line cases because of the mixed situation in Tanzania regarding national arms control standards. On the one hand, Tanzania enjoys relative stability in a volatile region and, as member to the Nairobi protocol on SALW, is actively engaged in implementing a national action plan to combat SALW proliferation. This includes legislative processes to amend national laws and efforts to strengthen enforcement capacities. Further, the Tanzanian Ministry of Defence submitted to the Walloon authorities an end-use declaration that the produced ammunition would only be used for domestic consumption. On the other hand, there are concerns regarding the presently existing standards in Tanzania to prevent diversions from production and stockpile sites and during transfers through theft, corrupt, or neglect.  

After initially granting the license, the decision became public and was criticised by, among other, the federal Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, arms control groups, and the media. In response, the Walloon authorities suspended the license in March 2005 for three months to reconsider their decisions. In particular, they sought to collate and evaluate new elements to adequately assess the risk of diversion of ammunition to be produced in Tanzania and the potentially destabilising effects in Tanzania and neighbouring countries of such diversions. 

Walloon delegation to clarify end-use condition

Activities during that period by the Walloon authorities included the sending of a governmental delegation to Tanzania to verify information on the ability of the Tanzanian state to ensure responsible national management of arms and ammunition. Through meetings with Tanzanian officials and arms control experts as well as an on-site visit of the existing production, the delegation could provide and clarify the conditions surrounding the export application. The delegation concluded that if the export were to be authorised, it would be of extreme pertinence to have strict end-use conditions as well as a speedy finalisation and implementation of Tanzania’s current overhaul of its arms control system.

At a minimum, the delegation assisted the Walloon export authorities in making a final decision on the basis of verified, detailed information rather than only on the basis of the Tanzanian end-use declaration. This, together with continued concerns voiced by the federal Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as by certain EU member states, finally led the Walloon export authorities to withdraw and deny the suspended license in June 2005.

1. The information presented in this box is based on research done by GRIP, June 2005.

4.2 Strengthening post-export verification

It is further desirable that EU member states exchange views and discuss experiences regarding their efforts to verify compliance by end users in cases where end-use assurances have been given. As mentioned, transfers of production capacities can entail medium and long term risks for continued proliferation which are not necessarily given in relation to exports of finite numbers of finished goods. EU member states should therefore retain their right to demand that importers grant access to production sites operating machines or technology originally exported from the EU.

A useful model in this context is found in the Bulgarian legislation on conventional arms exports. This legislation stipulates that national authorities “may require from the exporter the inclusion of a contractual provision allowing physical inspection by them or by officials authorised by them of the delivery under the foreign trade deal.” [29] Noteworthy in this context is also the USA. It operates stringent post-export controls in relation to defence articles particularly vulnerable to diversion or other misuse, or whose diversion or other misuse could have significant consequences. [30] For example, US authorities annually cross-check information held by them with data on stockpiled and employed MANPADS, including serial numbers and quantities, which is regularly submitted by recipients of US exported MANPADS. [31]

4.2.1 Sanctioning violations of end-use obligations

At the same time, EU member states may face limits in their ability to undertake post-export controls. The unsuccessful attempts by Belgian authorities to gain a clearer picture of production levels at the Kenyan Eldoret facility that was furnished with Belgian machinery are a case in point (see 2.2.1). EU member states should therefore also deepen their discussions on common approaches if faced by alleged or proven violations of end-use obligations.

Of interest here are the automatic sanctions imposed in Germany on a recipient found to have violated end-use obligations. That is, the  German Political Guidelines for the Export of Military Equipment stipulate that a recipient country which violated or failed to prevent or sanction a violation it was aware of is considered a non-desirable export destination. Export applications for military equipment to the recipient country are therefore denied as a matter of principle until such a time when the situation in the recipient country leading to the diversion has been redressed. [32]     

5. Conclusion and recommendations

As argued here, the expected advances in EU export controls on production capacities under the revised EU Code of Conduct are a welcome development but should be still further developed. Moreover, strengthened standards are, with a view to the development of high common export standards, highly desirable. In particular, it is recommended that EU member states:

Complement the revised EU Code with a common understanding that exports of production capacities for military equipment will be conditional on strict end-use conditions. The conditions should clearly stipulate that any re-transfer of production capacities is either banned or only permissible with prior written consent by the originally exporting state. Further, there should be clear stipulations as to the end-use and end user of the goods derived from the production capacities, as well as provisions allowing authorities of the originally exporting state to request adequate post-export information. Violations of end-use assurances or failure to provide access to production facilities or requested information should entail a memorandum on exports of military equipment to the recipient country.   

Develop guidelines to assist national authorities in the implementation of the EU Code’s criterion and operative provisions on preventing diversion risks. In particular, a sub-group of the EU Council working group COARM should develop common understandings on situations that would trigger a more detailed assessment of proliferation risks at the licensing stage. Factors to be considered for such detailed assessments should be detailed and provide national authorities with elements they should check for during their decision-making.



[1] . Defence industry interviews, France, Belgium, and Germany, April 2005.

[2] . Small Arms Survey (2002) Evaluating the human costs. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, p.43ff.

[3] . See website of FN Herstal: (accessed 23 May 2005).

[4] . Information held at GRIP.

[5] . Ibid.  

[6] . Small Arms Survey (2001) Profiling the Problem. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, p. 17.

[7] . Interview, German arms export official, Federal ministry of Economics, Berlin, June 2004.

[8] . Amnesty International (2004) Undermining Global Security: the European Union’s arms exports. AI, p.35f. 

[9] . Communication with German Federal Criminal Police, Bonn, January  2004.

[10] . Defence industry interviews, France, Belgium, and Germany, April 2005.

[11] . See Biting the Bullet (2001) Stockpile Security and Reducing Surplus Weapons. London: BASIC, Saferworld, International Alert.

[12] . Amnesty International (2004), p. 33ff.

[13] . Defence industry interviews, Belgium, April 2005.

[14] . Council of the European Union (1998) European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. EU Document 8675/2/98 REV 2. Brussels: European Union (adopted on 8 June 1998), Criterion 7 a-c.

[15] . See Council of the European Union (2003), Fifth Annual report according to operative provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. EU Council document 14712/03. Brussels, 24 November, p.13.

[16] . Draft revised EU Code of Conduct on the Export of Military Equipment. Operative provision 1b.

[17] . Ibid. Operative provision 4.

[18] . Ibid. Criterion 7. 

[19] . OSCE (2000) OSCE Document on SALW. Vienna: OSCE, Section III, A, 2b.vii and 2c.   

[20] . Ibid. Section III, A, 3.   

[21] . OSCE (2004) Principles for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). Vienna: OSCE, para. 2.1.

[22] . Ibid. paras. 2.5; and 2.6.

[23] . Defence industry interview, France, April 2005.

[24] . Politische Grundsätze der Bundesregierung  für den Export von Kriegswaffen und sonstigen Rüstungsgütern,
Berlin, 19 January 2000.

[25] . Politische Grundsätze der Bundesregierung. Section III.1; and Section IV.2.

[26] . Bericht der Bundesregierung über ihre Exportpolitik für konventionelle Rüstungsgüter im Jahre 2003

(Rüstungsexportbericht 2003), Berlin, 1 December 2004, p.17. 

[27] . See Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle (2002) Formularmuster zu Endverbleibserklärungen. Available at , accessed 15 April 2005.

[28] . Defence industry interview, Germany, April 2005.

[29] . Bulgaria. Law on the Control of Foreign Trade Activity in Arms and in Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, as amended in 2002, art. 17.7.

[30] . United States (2003) Arms Export Control Act, United States Code Title 22 – Foreign Relations and Intercourse, Chapter 39, as amended in 2003, section 2785.

[31] . US Department of Defense (2003) Security Assistance Management Manual, DoD 5105.38-M, Chapter 8 – End-Use Monitoring (EUM), October, point C8.3.3.5, p. 276.

[32] . Politische Grundsätze der Bundesregierung. Section iv.4.



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